



**You have downloaded a document from
RE-BUS
repository of the University of Silesia in Katowice**

Title: Dogmatism and criticism in the conception of phenomenological reduction

Author: Piotr Łaciak

Citation style: Łaciak Piotr. (2015). Dogmatism and criticism in the conception of phenomenological reduction. "Folia Philosophica" (T. 34 (2015), s. 101-124).



Uznanie autorstwa - Użycie niekomercyjne - Bez utworów zależnych Polska - Licencja ta zezwala na rozpowszechnianie, przedstawianie i wykonywanie utworu jedynie w celach niekomercyjnych oraz pod warunkiem zachowania go w oryginalnej postaci (nie tworzenia utworów zależnych).



UNIwersYTET ŚLĄSKI
W KATOWICACH



Biblioteka
Uniwersytetu Śląskiego



Ministerstwo Nauki
i Szkolnictwa Wyższego

Piotr Łaciak

Dogmatism and Criticism in the Conception of Phenomenological Reduction

Abstract: The author presents his own interpretation of phenomenological reduction taking as a starting point two motives of phenomenology identified by Ernst Tugendhat: the dogmatic motive and the critical motive. In the dogmatic interpretation, phenomenological reduction is driven by the need to meet the criterion of apodictic certainty and means excluding the world from the scope of phenomenological research and limiting it to the realm of transcendental awareness. It is only transcendental awareness that can be apodictically certain; the existence of the world never is. In the critical interpretation, the starting point for philosophizing is not apodictic certainty but a minimum amount of cognitive dogmatism attained through radical criticism. Phenomenological reduction itself no longer entails a subjectivist narrowing down of the field of study, but its expansion into a new domain: the domain of awareness in which the world is being constituted, awareness freed from anonymity. The aim of this critically interpreted reduction is the uncovering of the correlation between awareness and the world, which remains invisible in the natural approach. Reduction brings this correlation to light, suspending prejudices (*Vorurteile*), which result from the natural approach. The fact that prejudices are suspended means that one refrains from following them blindly, since a characteristic feature of all prejudices is that they do not admit reflection. It is important to distinguish between two types of prejudices: those which enable cognition and those which distort the picture of reality. The author demonstrates that phenomenological reduction may be understood as a postulate of criticism: to suspend prejudices in order to recognize their validity (legitimacy) in their claims to truth or to expose them as false awareness.

Keywords: dogmatism, criticism, phenomenological reduction, certainty, transcendental reflection, prejudice

Phenomenological Reduction and its Motivation

The basic thesis of Husserlian phenomenology may be formulated thusly: each man “carries in himself” the transcendental Self, but in a natural attitude, the transcendental character of subjectivity remains covered,

and at the same time, the transcendental of the consciousness can be revealed, the consequence of which is phenomenological reduction. "Obviously it can be said that, as an Ego in a natural attitude, I am likewise and at all times a transcendental Ego, but that I know about this only by conducting phenomenological reduction."¹

The natural attitude is the attitude that we take as people thrown into the world. In the natural attitude, we are unilaterally directed towards the world, and we cherish a belief about the reality of the world, without discerning the consciousness as the basis of the validity of this belief: an incarceration in the world is characteristic for the natural attitude, consciousness brought to the world, forgets about itself, and hides from itself.²

In Husserlian terminology, subjectivity remains anonymous in the natural attitude of the transcendental nature, that is, it is not subject to reflection. In phenomenology, "anonymous" means "covered," "non-thematic," "forgotten," "unfamiliar," "blind," as opposed to "being liable to reflection," which means "exposed," "thematic," "reaching clear consciousness, the evidence."³ According to Husserl, reflection is the only source of knowledge about subjectivity, thus, consciousness which is not subject to reflection (anonymous) does not know about itself and remains hidden to itself.

The transcendental nature of subjectivity that remains anonymous in the natural attitude, can be specified in terms of Karol Wojtyła's terminology as "the irreducible in man," irreducible to the world.⁴ Subjectivity cannot be reduced to the world and it gains the transcendental sense by constituting everything that is global, and in addition, it cannot discern this sense in the natural attitude.

¹ E. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*. Trans. D. Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p. 37.

² See E. Fink, "Philosophie als Überwindung der 'Naivität,'" in: *Nähe und Distanz. Phänomenologische Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Hrsg. von F.-A. Schwarz. (Freiburg-München: Verlag Karl Alber, 2004), pp. 107–108; E. Fink, "Edmund Husserl," in: *Nähe und Distanz...*, p. 89.

³ See G. Hoffmann, *Bewusstsein, Reflexion und Ich bei Husserl*. (Freiburg-München: Verlag Karl Alber, 2001), p. 118–132. More about "anonymous": See P. Łaciak, *Anonimowość jako granica poznania w fenomenologii Edmunda Husserla*. (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2012).

⁴ See K. Wojtyła, "Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man," *Analecta Husserliana* 1978, Vol. 7, pp. 107–114.

The “irreducible” in man (in Husserlian language: the transcendental as the quintessence of subjectivity) can only be revealed by means of phenomenological reduction. The concept of phenomenological reduction is a rather unfortunate phrase, because it provides an opportunity for the misinterpretation of transcendental phenomenology. Ernst Tugendhat, who admits that speaking about reduction is misleading, highlights this fact. It can be said that the natural attitude is the one that can be reduced, because in the natural attitude we are directed unilaterally to the world, not perceiving the consciousness in which the world is constituted, while, when it comes to the phenomenological attitude, we cross the limits of natural cognition and gain an insight into the consciousness constituting the world.⁵ Therefore, reduction does not mean a literal reduction, but it is rather a disclosure of the “irreducible” in man, the uncovering of the transcendental Self, which is “carried” inside by each human being. It is not a coincidence that Husserl says explicitly that transcendental consciousness is the *residuum* of phenomenological reduction, in other words, it is what remains after the phenomenological exclusion. The reduction reveals the transcendental source of meaning, suspending (*epoché*) what the source veils: in the natural attitude, the transcendental nature of subjectivity remains anonymous, because subjectivity undergoes prejudices (*Vorurteile*), which can be described as unexpressed, unconscious, unreflexively-fulfilled opinions, founded secretly in a natural experience, so that the exposure of the transcendental of the consciousness is suspending prejudices at the same time, the source of which is naivety of the natural attitude. In this context, one can refer to Gerda Brand’s comment that the reduction has two aspects: negative and positive, and so it is the cessation “from,” the suspension, and also descending “to,” it is the unveiling giving access to the transcendental basis.⁶

⁵ See E. Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co, 1967), pp. 200, 213.

⁶ See G. Brand, *Welt, Ich und Zeit. Nach unveröffentlichten Manuskripten Edmund Husserls*. (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), p. 6.

The reduction should, therefore, bring the subject out of natural concealment, prevent it from oblivion, and refute its anonymity. "Reduction—according to Paul Janssen—has the character of the theoretical discovery of the transcendental basis of natural life and its world."⁷ Phenomenological reduction allows for the transition from the natural attitude to the phenomenological (unnatural) attitude; furthermore, the abolition of the anonymity of transcendental life is the consequence of this transition. Husserlian phenomenology requires an orientation contrary to nature, such an orientation is attained through reflection: instead of directing straight towards the objects, we turn to collective experiences, in which we become aware of the objects. Stanisław Judycki emphasizes the relationship between phenomenological reduction and reflection, arguing that the reduction can be interpreted as "a transition from the natural attitude—taking place directly, with or without reflection, but then as so-called psychological reflection—to the transcendental attitude as the reflective-transcendental attitude."⁸ The commentator adds: "Adopting such an attitude, in which consciousness given in acts of reflection does not appear as a component of real being entangled in causal-worldly relationships, but as the pure transcendental consciousness, is equivalent to the accomplishment of the transcendental reduction."⁹ Phenomenological reduction can be, therefore, considered as a moment of reflection: in a reflection, the transcendental is disclosed.¹⁰ In other words, phenomenological reduction can be understood as a part of the reflective model of self-consciousness, and can be considered as the moment of reflection of transcendental consciousness of itself alone. The anonymity of transcendental subjectivity is overcome after the accomplishment of the phenomenological reduction, in such a way that the transcenden-

⁷ P. Janssen, *Geschichte und Lebenswelt. Ein Beitrag zur Diskussion von Husserls Spätwerk*. (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 131–132.

⁸ S. Judycki, *Intersubiektywność i czas. Przyczynek do dyskusji nad późną fazą poglądów Edmunda Husserla*. (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL, 1990), p. 181.

⁹ S. Judycki, *Intersubiektywność i czas...*, p. 181.

¹⁰ See P. Łaciak, *Anonimowość jako granica poznania w fenomenologii Edmunda Husserla...*, p. 131–142.

tal consciousness undergoes a transformation into self-consciousness. This self-consciousness is characterized by self-knowledge.¹¹

The phenomenological reduction itself can be motivated either *dogmatically* or *critically*. Ernst Tugendhat discerns of the presence of dogmatic and critical motifs in the phenomenology.¹² Both dogmatic and critical motifs are in fact two different motifs of the phenomenological reduction, understood as the abandonment of the natural attitude followed by the transition to the transcendental subjectivity. As such, these motifs are inextricably linked with two ways of achieving the phenomenological reduction—Cartesian and Kantian ones, which were used by Husserl in his endeavour to consolidate the possibility of performing the reduction.¹³ The dogmatic motif is connected with the Cartesian desire to achieve absolutely certain knowledge.

From the dogmatic point of view, the aim of the phenomenology is to uncover an indisputable sphere of the existence, which is the realm of pure consciousness, the consciousness given to us in an absolute certainty. The phenomenology, as a science of pure consciousness, actually embodies the idea of rigorous science, that is, absolutely certain and definitively established science. In contrast, the final consolidation of cognition cannot be achieved by means of the critical way, but understood as the Kantian regulative idea, limiting our cognition, while phenomenology is understood as the critique of knowledge, which has to prove the legitimacy of our beliefs arising from the natural attitude or expose them as groundless claims. In the context of Tugendhat's distinction of two motifs, Józef Czarkowski points out that Hus-

¹¹ The cognitive relation is shaped during the reflection, namely, subject-object. To be more specific, during the reflection, the sphere of consciousness divides into an act of reflection and also into the object of reflection. In this way, due to the reflection, the consciousness transforms into self-consciousness, while the reflective self-consciousness is tantamount to self-knowledge. Self-awareness can also be unreflective self-awareness, which means non-objective (unthematic) consciousness of oneself. According to Husserl, in case of unreflective self-consciousness, there is no cognitive grasp, thus, unreflective (anonymous) self-consciousness is not a cognition. See P. Łaciak, *Anonimowość jako granica poznania w fenomenologii Edmunda Husserla...*, pp. 273–290.

¹² See E. Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger...*, pp. 194–196, 201–205.

¹³ About the ways of achieving the reduction see: I. Kern, *Husserl und Kant. Eine Untersuchung über Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus*. (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff 1964), pp. 192–245; P. Łaciak, *Anonimowość jako granica poznania w fenomenologii Edmunda Husserla...*, pp. 73–121.

serl sets forth two tasks: “[...] firstly, the phenomenology has to reach to what is given in an indisputable way, adequately and peremptorily, and, secondly, phenomenology has to be the final brightening of senses and meanings that we attach to objects in science and in everyday life.”¹⁴ Due to those tasks, two ways of consolidating knowledge can be considered: firstly, about the Cartesian (dogmatic) way, the aim of which is to assure apodictic evidence, which has to be the point of departure of radical philosophy, the evidence, which presents only the transcendental subjectivity juxtaposed with the world. This world is never given in comparable evidence; secondly, about the Kantian (critical) way motivated by the need of the ultimate understanding of the sense of the evidence, the understanding which requires the unveiling of covered correlation between the consciousness and the world in the natural attitude.

There is no need to set a distinct demarcation line between “the dogmatic phenomenology” and “the critical phenomenology.” It can be assumed that Husserl’s texts, such as *Idea of phenomenology*, *Five lectures*, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy* or *Cartesian Meditations* are connected with the dogmatic motif, whereas, other texts, such as *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, *The Crisis of European Sciences* and *Experience and Judgement* are the development of the critical motif. Practically, however, these two motifs intertwine in individual Husserl’s treatises. The development of thought of this German philosopher was gradually abandoning dogmatism and making the critical intention more prominent. And more importantly, the critical motif of phenomenology is clearly recognisable in his “Cartesian” texts, and still, it was not set free from dogmatism in his works considered as “critical.” It can be said directly that in some Husserlian works, one of the motifs includes another within itself, in such a way that the latter motif is not neglected, but to some extent, can be read from the first one.

¹⁴ J. Czarkowski, *Filozofia czystej świadomości. Redukcja, refleksja, czysta świadomość w fenomenologii transcendentalnej Edmunda Husserla*. (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 1994), pp. 37–38.

Phenomenological reduction as an expression of transcendental dogmatism

There is no doubt that within the dogmatic motif, which—to use Husserlian terminology—can be called the Cartesian way to reduction, the restrictive character of the phenomenological reduction is presented; the reduction is an exclusion of, parenthesising or suspension of the world and by this, constitutes a limitation on the area of research into the sphere of pure consciousness.¹⁵ Following the Cartesian way, it begins with apodictic evidence of *ego cogito*, which is assumed as pre-given (*vorgegeben*) and constitutes Archimedes' point of philosophy, and the phenomenology itself, as a science which starts with such an apodictic evidence and justified by it ultimately, and turns out to be a science radically legitimized and lacking assumption. In this way, apodictic evidence is given as an epistemological, but historically unconditioned absolute. Hence the conclusion that—according to Andrzej J. Noras—“Husserlian phenomenology [...] following the Cartesian way, is ahistorical.”¹⁶ The Cartesian way leads to a transcendental *ego* in “one leap.”¹⁷

Apodictic evidence established dogmatically, which means, the evidence understood as the certainty of the existence of things and the state of those things, constitutes radical and impossible to correct, criterion of cognitive legitimacy, and also the criterion of the phenomenological reduction. This means that the phenomenological reduction is in fact an exclusion (*epoché*) of that what is essentially questionable, which does not fulfill the requirement of apodictic evidence, and cannot compete with absolutely given transcendental subjectivity. The reduction

¹⁵ See G.H. Shin, *Die Struktur des inneren Zeitbewußtseins. Eine Studie über den Begriff der Protention in den veröffentlichten Schriften Edmund Husserls*. (Bern: Peter Lang, 1978), p. 79–80.

¹⁶ A.J. Noras, *Kant a neokantyzm badeński i marburski*. (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2005), p. 131.

¹⁷ See E. Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*. Hrsg. von W. Biemel, in: *Husserliana—Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke*. Bd. 6. (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 158.

consists in the suspension, parenthesising the so-called general thesis of the natural attitude, and as a result, it is based on the suspension of the existence of the world, which is equivalent to this thesis.¹⁸ The thesis of the natural attitude has a character of conviction based on the certainty of the existence of the world, the certainty, by which we become pre-reflectively conscious of the world as the existing, that is, existing prior to any possible reference to consciousness, and we recognize ourselves as people existing in the world. The general thesis pervades our entire natural life, all detailed existential theses, in which there is a recognition of the existence of some (external to consciousness) entities. The thesis should be suspended, because the recognized existence of the world does not meet the requirement of apodictic evidence, and it is demonstrated by the “criticism of the world of experience,” the criticism motivated by the possibility of world-annihilation (*Weltvernichtung*).¹⁹ Precisely, the real world recognized in the thesis of the natural attitude does not need to exist and it requires the constant confirmation in the further course of the experience. The thesis about the existence of the world turns out to be a generally random one, and it is suspended between actuality and expectation: that the world is, is considered as a fact in this thesis, and this recognition is made under the expectation that the future actual sequence of experiences will constantly affirm the current course, as the possibility of the collapse of the course cannot be excluded; moreover, it is impossible to exclude the possibility of the destruction of the world.²⁰ In this context, Husserl

¹⁸ See E. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Buch 1: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*. Neu hrsg. von K. Schuhmann. Halbband 1. Text der 1.–3. Aufl., in: *Husserliana—Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke*. Bd. 3/1. (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), pp. 62–64.

¹⁹ See E. Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Teil 2: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion*. Hrsg. von R. Boehm, in: *Husserliana—Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke*. Bd. 8. (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), pp. 69–80. See also E. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie...*, Buch 1, Halbband 1, pp. 96–99, 103–106.

²⁰ See E. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie...*, Buch 1, Halbband 1, pp. 96–99, 103–106. See also T. Seebohm, *Die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Transzendental-Philosophie. Edmund Husserls transzendental-phänomenologischer Ansatz, dargestellt im Anschluss an seine Kant-Kritik*. (Bonn: H. Bouvier u. Co. Verlag, 1962), pp. 59–60.

speaks directly about “apodictic confidence of the possible non-existence of the world.”²¹

If possible non-existence of the world is apodictically certain, in order to meet the requirement of apodictic evidence, the thesis on the existence of the world has to be suspended, subject to reduction. The sphere of what is apodictically certain is not subject to the reduction, and the sought phenomenological *residuum* proves to be pure consciousness, which remains in its being intact, even though we exclude the whole world. Therefore, Husserl juxtaposes the random thesis concerning the world with the thesis concerning the existence of the transcendental consciousness, which is a necessary thesis, liable to question, and as such, does not require confirmation in the further course of the experience.²² Even after the annihilation of the world, only I myself, as a real psychophysical individual, would share its fate, while my pure consciousness would remain intact in its being. By emphasizing the randomness of the general thesis of the natural attitude, Husserl is able to expose the questionable domain of being, the domain of transcendental consciousness, consciousness presenting itself in an absolute confidence.

Within the Cartesian-justified reduction, we come to a narrow concept of subjectivity, obtained due to the radical opposition of the transcendental to what is the world. This may result in the Cartesian dualism (absolute) of the necessary transcendental existence and a random human being Self, the dualism hindering the understanding of their mutual reference and closing access to the study of transcendental consciousness in its specific content. This understanding of the reduction leads, thus, to contrasting the consciousness to the world, opposing the favourable metaphysical dogmatization of the sphere of the transcendental consciousness, that is, narrowing it to a field of some field of existence, separated from other fields. On the other hand, the metaphysical

²¹ E. Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24)*..., Teil 2, p. 69.

²² See E. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*..., Buch 1, Halbband 1, p. 98.

narrowing of the field of consciousness generates a difficulty concerning the possibility of the transition from the field of consciousness to other fields of being, especially, the field of the world. Thus, the phenomenology faces the Cartesian problem of an epistemological bridge as a part of a narrow understanding of the consciousness. Moreover, it seems that consciousness contrasted with the world, does not form the world, because it implies an irretrievable loss of the world.²³ The Cartesian juxtaposition of the transcendental and the global can thus lead—to use a term created by Wojciech Chudy²⁴—to the trap of reflection, which means getting stuck in introverted subjectivity, an unintentional one, determined only by experiences. Husserl himself was aware of those difficulties, and he gradually liberated his philosophy from Cartesian dualism and his fundamentalism.

In the texts from the 1920's, and in the later development of his views in *The Crisis of European Sciences*, Husserl discerns the flaws of the Cartesian way, yet, although he gradually distances himself from it, he never abandons it completely. In his text coming probably from 1924, Husserl writes explicitly that one should avoid talking about the exclusion of the world, about the pure consciousness treated as something that remains after the exclusion, since it implies that after the reduction one concentrates only on the subjectivity and the world ceases to be the phenomenological subject. This, in his opinion, opens a path towards a psychologistic misinterpretation of pure consciousness: the consciousness might be misunderstood as a purely mental life, abstractly extracted from the existing world, which is not the subjectivity constituting the world.²⁵

²³ See I. Kern, *Husserl und Kant...*, pp. 203–204.

²⁴ See W. Chudy, *Rozwój filozofowania a „pułapka refleksji.” Filozofia refleksji i próby jej przewyciężenia*. (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1995), pp. 115–124.

²⁵ See E. Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24)...*, Teil 2, pp. 432–433.

Phenomenological reduction as a critical recognition of superstitions of the natural attitude

In the context of the critical motif, which we call the Kantian way towards the reduction,²⁶ the final establishment of cognition upon a firm fundament is not actually achievable; instead, it is construed as a regulative idea, which by the necessity of its importance determines the entirety of actual cognitions.²⁷ It is doubtlessly about the regulative idea in the Kantian sense, which in Husserl's phenomenology—in Paul Ricoeur's view—plays a mediating role between history and consciousness, because it is this idea that becomes reified in a never-ending historical process.²⁸ “It is owing to infinity—writes Ricoeur—that the idea implies history, the process with no end.”²⁹ As a consequence, the absolute idea of philosophy is a purpose that settles in the future.³⁰ In this context, Iso Kern notes that Husserl's distancing from the Cartesian way towards the reduction and striding with Kantian's way, in no case it does not mean abandoning the ideal of philosophy as a strict science but it is only its modification. The modification consists in that the overbearing obviousness is no longer the starting point of philosophy but is *wanted* in the way of radical self-criticism. “The absolute evidence—comments Kern—is no longer something given but something *asked*, that is an *idea*, as Husserl admits himself in ‘Formal logic and transcendental logic.’”³¹

If overbearing obviousness does not constitute the starting point of philosophy, the reduction is no longer motivated by the need to meet the apodictic evidence requirement. In consequence, the reduction does not yet have the restrictive character, it does not spell the limiting

²⁶ Here, we use the term “Kantian way to reduction” to signify the way, which Husserl himself called the “way through ontology,” “way through critique of the positive sciences,” or the “way through *Lebenswelt*.” On this way, conducting reduction is initially motivated by Kant's critique of cognition.

²⁷ See E. Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*..., p. 195.

²⁸ See P. Ricoeur, “Husserl et le sens l'histoire,” *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 1949, tome 54, p. 282.

²⁹ P. Ricoeur, “Husserl et le sens l'histoire,” p. 291.

³⁰ See E. Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24)*..., Teil 2, p. 196.

³¹ I. Kern, *Husserl und Kant*..., p. 237.

of the field of examination to the field of the awareness. Husserl's fundamental intention on the critical way, comes down to denudations of correlation between the awareness and the world noticed by Kant. With the reduction we reach the awareness that forms the world and forming means the process, which occurs as a part of intentional correlation between the awareness and the world. The process in which the world along with all objects existing in it, appears in the awareness as it is.³² We will express the same thought, if we say that with the reduction we are reaching not only the sphere of very experiences, but as much correlation between experiences and objects as hidden in natural attitude. Therefore the reduction does not entail a subjective narrowing of the field of examinations, but its extension for the new dimension-dimension of the awareness freed from the anonymity, in which the world is forming in. Iso Kern peculiarly and strongly emphasizes that phenomenological reduction in a critical interpretation, does not mean limitation of the subject to a special field of existence but it constitutes crossing restrictions of the natural-objective cognition. The natural-objective cognition appears as "unilateral," "abstract," "external," "superficial" while the reduction "appears as a step toward of that what is "versatile," "specific," "internal," of that what has "deep dimension" (the last one includes "the superficial").³³ The reduction can be thusly interpreted as overcoming the naivety of the natural attitude and requires an "overall change of the natural attitude."³⁴ That is the change that Kant called for with his Copernican revolution which constitutes "leaving the way of consolidating the naive-objectivist learning."³⁵

From this point of view, the phenomenological attitude presents itself—as Gui H. Shin comments—as the critical-reflective attitude that: as the critical attitude it does not refer to unjustified assumptions (superstitions), as the reflective attitude it signifies a turnaround "from

³² See P. Łaciak, *Anonimowość jako granica poznania w fenomenologii Edmunda Husserla...*, pp. 60–70, 142–158.

³³ I. Kern, *Husserl und Kant...*, p. 233.

³⁴ E. Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie...*, p. 151.

³⁵ E. Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften...*, p. 202.

objective experience of the world to subjective conditions of the possibility of the cognition.”³⁶ Sebastian Luft determines the criticism as “eliminating the naivety.”³⁷ Closely saying, a task of the criticism of cognition is the suspension of superstitions, of which the source is the naivety of the natural attitude. Giving some thought to the scope of the phenomenological reduction, Husserl says himself about *epoché* with reference to all superstitions, and the whole of superstitions constitutes the tradition³⁸. A superstition—Husserl thinks—is an “unjustified opinion,”³⁹ we can add, “unjustified” because established as pre-given (*vorgegeben*), self-evident, accepted before all the recognition, accepted naively, mindlessly. Władysław Stróżewski notices that the most important feature of convictions, and this applies *a fortiori* to superstition, should be their lack of reflection.⁴⁰ Prejudices lack reflection and this makes their recognition impossible, because reflection is the only source of knowledge about the experiences of the consciousness. If, therefore, it is characteristic for the natural consciousness to surrender to various kinds of superstitions without any reflection, we cannot recognize those superstitions in the natural reflection. To recognize the prejudices of the natural attitude, we have to quit this attitude, and we quit the natural attitude when we submit it to reflection, which is possible due to phenomenological reduction. Reflective exposure of the prejudices and their suspension are not two different successive phases of the phenomenological method, because the reflective thematisation of prejudices equals their suspension.⁴¹ *The suspension of superstitions means refraining from their mindless compliance, that is, subjecting them to the reflection*

³⁶ G.H. Shin, *Die Struktur des inneren Zeitbewusstseins...*, p. 73.

³⁷ See S. Luft, “*Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie*.” *Systematik und Methodologie der Phänomenologie in der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Husserl und Fink*. (Dordrecht–Boston–London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 66.

³⁸ E. Husserl, *Zur phänomenologischen Reduktion. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1926–1935)*. Hrsg. von S. Luft, in: *Husserliana—Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke*. Bd. 34. (Dordrecht–Boston–London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 441.

³⁹ E. Husserl, *Zur phänomenologischen Reduktion...*, p. 441.

⁴⁰ W. Stróżewski, “O przeświadczeniach,” in: *Logos, wartość, miłość*. (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2013), p. 88.

⁴¹ See E. Ströker, *Phänomenologische Studien*. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987), pp. 42–43.

(*recognition*). Therefore, the reflection turns out to be a method of criticism, and the phenomenological attitude is—as previously pointed out, referring to Shin—the critical-reflective attitude. The base of knowledge which was not examined should not be accepted in the phenomenology, while all superstitions should be recognized, and in addition, when the superstition is subjected to the reflection is not superstition anymore.⁴² According to Sebastian Luft, the aim of phenomenology, which aims to the realization of the idea of philosophy as a rigorous science, is surrendering superstitions to the critical reflection, that is, watching them, understanding them as superstition and “gaining possibly the greatest level of self-clarity with reference to the elements which have not been thematized yet (in Husserlian terminology ‘anonymous’).”⁴³

Husserl distances himself from Cartesian fundamentalism, not only because it supports the metaphysical dogmatization of the transcendental consciousness, but also because the basic thesis of phenomenology about the anonymity of the transcendental consciousness present in the natural attitude, quoted at the beginning of the article, challenges the Cartesian belief about the self-clarity of the consciousness. If the consciousness is initially immersed in anonymity, it turns out to be, in the point of departure, unknown, veiled, unclear. Moreover, when the consciousness undergoes naturalistic prejudices, it becomes one that is hypocritical and false. Naturalistic interpretation of the world, typical of the positive sciences which lack absolute justification, because they remain within the natural attitude and, not only do they undergo world’s prejudice, but they also absolutize world ridiculously, slipping into naturalistic prejudices, that is, raise to the rank of an absolute what turns out to be something relative—something that is constantly established by consciousness. This results in a complete oblivion of consciousness that establishes the world.⁴⁴ This total oblivion of the transcendental subjectivity is called crisis, which marks the omnipotent reign of objectivism. Positive sciences

⁴² See S. Luft, “*Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie*”..., pp. 61, 77–78.

⁴³ S. Luft, “*Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie*”..., p. 20.

⁴⁴ See S. Judycki, *Intersubiektywność i czas*..., p. 218.

positively heighten anonymity that comes from the natural setting, while the crisis might be interpreted as lasting of the transcendental life in anonymity.⁴⁵ The sciences do not reveal the transcendental life, but they conceal it with naiveties of a higher order, the theoretical ones, whereas, the objectivist interpretation of the world leads to the empiricist (skeptical) worldview.⁴⁶ Therefore, one who believes that the positive sciences liberate us from prejudices of the natural attitude, is wrong.

In this context, Sebastian Luft points out that the higher degree naivety that pervades positive sciences is *dogmatized* naivety, so that one should make a distinction between the natural-naïve attitude, one that is right for the pre-scientific life in the world, and the natural-dogmatic attitude, that is, the attitude of the positive sciences.⁴⁷ According to this distinction, Luft speaks about the “good” and “bad” sense of the prejudice. The general thesis of the natural attitude constitutes a prejudice in a positive sense, the one that does not conceal the image of reality, but makes the world available (in other words, the prejudice, which does not impede cognition of the world, but allows for it), while we learn about the legitimacy of its claim to be universally binding only after the reduction.⁴⁸ This prejudice is typical of the natural attitude naivety, the natural one means pre-scientific, and “the natural attitude—as noted by Luft—remains *concealed for itself*, knows nothing of itself *as* the natural attitude, because if it had known about itself, it would not be the *natural* attitude anymore,”⁴⁹ and this ignorance protects it from dogmatization and the absolutization of the naivety. On the other hand, the one in the negative sense (the naturalistic prejudice) distorts the image of the reality. Such a prejudice constitutes the dogmatization of the naivety comprised in the natural attitude, as it is generated

⁴⁵ See P. Łaciak, *Anonimowość jako granica poznania...*, pp. 28–38.

⁴⁶ See S. Luft, “*Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie*”..., p. 76.

⁴⁷ See S. Luft, “*Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie*”..., pp. 61–66, 72–78.

⁴⁸ In the natural attitude itself, its consciousness of the bindingness of this world does not allow itself to be made a subject of [thematizing], and, in effect, we leave the natural attitude when we make it the object of phenomenological study. See E. Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie...*, p. 151.

⁴⁹ S. Luft, “*Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie*”..., p. 61.

by the sciences lasting dogmatically in this attitude, and as a result of this dogmatization, the natural attitude undergoes naturalistic distortion. The prejudice in the negative sense means, therefore, a higher degree naivety, which implicates the absolutization of something that has only relative meaning, the naivety which insidiously takes root there, where it has to be overcome, namely, in science.⁵⁰

Phenomenological reduction, essentially, is motivated by the abolition of the anonymity of the transcendental life, the anonymity that is a source of diverse prejudices. Overcoming the anonymity of consciousness in the critical version does not mean an immediate shift into the subjectivity, but an arduous work of becoming conscious. One reflects on prejudices in order to examine the basis of their legitimacy, and in the absence of such a legitimacy, one exposes prejudices as groundless, usurping claims, falsely absolutizing relative truths, obscuring the real image of the world.⁵¹ According to the distinction of superstitions in terms of positive and negative, criticism itself is therefore both positive and negative.

If a prejudice is an unjustified judgment (unjustified because, it is mindlessly satisfied), thus, the positive sense that criticism has the power to justify and, as a consequence, prejudices become justified judgments after conducting such a critique. The critique understood positively has to demonstrate that our natural approach to the world is well-founded, that the naivety of the natural attitude has its own powers, which can be recognized by making reduction.⁵² The Natural-naive life is permeated with a thesis on the existence of the world, because this thesis should be considered as a universal prejudice.⁵³ This universal prejudice is founded secretly in all the natural experience and the source from which it draws its sense, cannot be identified in the natural attitude.

⁵⁰ See S. Luft, "Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie"..., pp. 65–66.

⁵¹ See S. Luft, "Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie"..., p. 66.

⁵² See E. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie...*, Buch 1, Halbband 1, pp. 120–121. See S. Luft: "Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie"..., p. 66.

⁵³ See E. Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*. Hrsg. von W. Biemel, in: *Husserliana—Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke*. Bd. 9. (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 528–531.

The critical recognition of the basis of the legitimacy of the thesis of the natural attitude constitutes the transcendental insight that is possible due to the phenomenological reduction. Invalidating this thesis is not the result of this recognition. Husserl, unlike Descartes, never doubted the existence of the world. The phenomenologist does not dispute the existence of the world of the natural attitude, but he tries to understand it. "That the world exists, that it is given as the existing universe in uninterrupted experience that is constantly fusing into universal concordance, is entirely beyond doubt. But it is quite another matter to understand this indubitability that sustains life and positive science and to clarify the ground of its legitimacy."⁵⁴ The phenomenologist does not invalidate the general thesis of the natural attitude, but recognizes it, trying to understand as the belief, from which depends the validity of our experience of the world. Recognizing the thesis of the natural attitude, we only change the modus; the modus of the experience lacking reflection (prejudice) into the modus of the experience that was subject to reflection (thematic). In the natural attitude, the thesis about the existence of the world as a universal prejudice conceals itself from reflection, and only after the *epoché* is done, it is released from an anonymous compliance and is made more distinct as an experience conditioning the existence of the world. By making reduction, we realize that we find the existing reality only because we recognize it as an existing one, we recognize it under the thesis of the natural attitude, and that we have to present the reality as co-acknowledged in the thesis, as the thesis correlate, finally: as the correlate of subjectivity that operates as the one that fulfills the thesis. After the reduction, we recognize the thesis of the natural attitude as the constituting achievement of consciousness, because the constitution itself expresses the correlation between consciousness and the world, the correlation hidden in a natural attitude, while the reduction is uncovering the process of the transcendental consti-

⁵⁴ E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer. (Dordrecht–Boston–London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), p. 420.

tution of the world.⁵⁵ Consequently, the thesis of the natural attitude has its privilege in hidden setting intentional functions of consciousness in the natural attitude. In this way, by suspending the thesis of the natural attitude as a universal prejudice, the phenomenologist reaches the absolutely given transcendental subjectivity by using reflection, which should be considered as a source of the legitimacy of the thesis.

In contrast, the criticism in a negative sense is pervaded with unmasking intention: it is tracking those superstitions, which will always remain unjustified judgments, namely, judgments, whose claim to gain power turns out to be groundless. Negative criticism which is understood, means releasing the cognitive consciousness from prejudices in the “wrong” sense, particularly, from the naturalistic prejudices. If the naturalistic prejudices are dogmatization of the naivety comprised in the thesis of the natural attitude, hence, the recognition of the base of the legitimacy of the thesis of the natural attitude is, at the same time, unmasking false consciousness (consciousness obscured with naturalistic prejudices). As a result, the critical recognition of the natural attitude thesis has healing power for the positive sciences. By recognizing the thesis of the natural attitude as an experience that constitutes our natural world, the phenomenologist releases the world and the sciences from ridicule, naturalistic absolutization, and this results in depriving them of their typical naivety. Phenomenology, therefore, does not eliminate the world cognition, but explains its sense, limiting to what is constituted, that is to say, to the world as a correlate of constitutional achievements of consciousness. Natural cognitions are abolished to the extent, in which they are deprived of naturalistic naivety, while they are retained to the extent in which they undergo the transcendental understanding.⁵⁶ Reduction as a change in attitude is exceeding the limits of the natural-objective knowledge, but this

⁵⁵ See P. Łaciak, *Anonimowość jako granica poznania...*, pp. 142–158.

⁵⁶ See E. Fink, *VI. Cartesianische Meditation. Teil 1: Die Idee einer transzendentalen Methodenlehre. Texte aus dem Nachlass Eugen Finks (1932) mit Anmerkungen und Beilagen aus dem Nachlass Edmund Husserls (1933/34)*. Hrsg. von H. Ebeling, J. Holl, G. van Kerckhoven, in: *Husserliana—Dokumente*. Bd. 2/1. (Dordrecht–Boston–London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), pp. 129–130.

excess does not mean its impoverishment, but enrichment with the new deep dimension, with the dimension of transcendental subjectivity, in which this knowledge is included and from which derives sense.⁵⁷

In the critical version, the phenomenological reduction can be considered as a postulate of criticism: one should suspend the validity of any prejudices in order to recognize the legitimacy of its claims to the binding force or to expose as false consciousness distorting the image of reality. The idea of suspending prejudices turns out to be an endless work, as the complete self-clarity of the consciousness actually can never be achieved, but it has a regulative sense, the sense of an unfinished task.⁵⁸ Thus, phenomenology is set to fulfill the idea of philosophy as a strict science, or the universal and absolutely justified science, but the complete and full self-knowledge of the transcendental consciousness is not possible. Rigor should—according to Seebohm—refer to ultimately justifying criticism, if the opportunity of conducting such a criticism is apodictically certain.⁵⁹ One should remark that in phenomenology, the criticism is possible only on the basis of the apodictic attitude of certainty. According to Tugendhat, the combination of critical motivation and dogmatic motivation constitutes a dogmatic assumption that weakens the radicalism of criticism.⁶⁰ However, such a viewpoint is disputable. Husserl's intentions are described better by Klaus Rosen, who in contrast to the Tugendhat, concludes that criticism can only be radical when it is done on the basis of apodictic evidence. “*Pure immanence of evidence*—as Rosen writes—is required as the medium of phenomenological research, because the critique of knowledge wants to be *radical*. The dogmatic theme does not join the critical theme acciden-

⁵⁷ We can say outright that it is precisely in the natural attitude that scientific cognition becomes impoverished, because the sciences, immersed in the world, investigate established fields without perceiving the consciousness in which these objects are constituted.

⁵⁸ See G. Hoffmann, “Die Zweideutigkeit der Reflexion als Wahrnehmung von Anonymität,” *Husserl Studies* 1997, Vol. 14, p. 116.

⁵⁹ See T. Seebohm, *Die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Transzendental-Philosophie...*, p. 65 (footnote 45).

⁶⁰ See E. Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger...*, pp. 195–196.

tally or on a whim, but it is the radicalism of the criticism that requires the dogmatic ground of evidence.”⁶¹

The thesis that the dogmatic motif is attached to the critical one, is however, quite inaccurate. The very apodictic evidence in the dogmatic interpretation turns to be a prejudice from the point of view of the criticism of knowledge, because it is founded as a given in advance, naively regarded as the beginning of all philosophy, adopted before any possible justification. If the phenomenology in the critical version should not accept any prejudices, it also cannot naively assume the apodictic evidence of *ego cogito*. Therefore, phenomenology requires criticism in relation to itself: the requirement of criticism must be transferred to the criticism of the phenomenological evidence of the description of the transcendental sphere.⁶² Otherwise, we will not move beyond the level of transcendental naivety.

Providing that the apodictic nature of *ego cogito* is beforehand made a requirement for the testing of the legitimacy of any claims in the dogmatic interpretation, the requirement naively accepted without critical examination of its rationale, then in the critical interpretation, we try to undermine the legitimacy of the apodictic evidence, subjecting it to a negation and doubt test in reflection. It turns out that the apodictic evidence of *ego cogito* cannot be negated, because with each test of negation or doubt it is confirmed again: if I try to acknowledge *ego cogito* each single time (for example, the content of the observation) as non-existent or doubtful, then immediately, I understand the groundlessness of the assumption of non-existence and being undeniable in the critical reflection, in such a way that the very existence remains not only intact, but also confirmed.⁶³ Hence, the conclusion that for the apodictic nature “I am”—as noted by Shigeru Taguchi—

⁶¹ K. Rosen, *Evidenz in Husserls deskriptiver Transzendentalphilosophie*. (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1977), p. 147.

⁶² See E. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie...*, Buch 1, Halbband 1, p. 133. More on the self-criticism of phenomenology: see S. Luft, “Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie”..., pp. 8–22.

⁶³ See E. Husserl, *Einleitung in die Philosophie. Vorlesungen 1922/23*. Hrsg. von B. Goossens, in, *Husserliana—Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke*. Bd. 35. (Dordrecht–Boston–London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), pp. 63, 116.

there is not only no real, but also an ideal or imaginative alternative that would contradict it, because all possibilities are rooted in this apodictic nature.⁶⁴ In the light of the phenomenological self-criticism, the apodictic evidence appears to be the minimum of dogmatism of all knowledge, because all knowledge is done within the apodictic nature of *ego cogito*. The criticism of knowledge reaches the evidence which does not require any further criticism of the obvious: each attempt to justify it would be pointless, since all justification must be based on it.⁶⁵ One names the apodictic evidence of *ego cogito* the minimum of knowledge, because it is the basis of all of binding, the foundation, without which one cannot think of any knowledge, but that which does not enrich the content of knowledge.⁶⁶ As the minimum of the dogmatism of knowledge, the apodictic evidence is no longer—as in the Cartesian way—the restrictive requirement of the certainty of the knowledge which limits the field of phenomenological research to the sphere of absolutely given consciousness and favouring the metaphysical dogmatization of this sphere. Therefore, if one discusses the combination of the critical motif with the dogmatic one, it is not in the sense that the dogmatic motif attaches to the critical motif absolutely, but in the sense that the criticism of knowledge requires a minimum of dogmatism, which constitutes the apodictic evidence, without which no knowledge would be possible.

⁶⁴ See S. Taguchi, *Das Problem des „Ur-Ich“ bei Edmund Husserl. Die Frage nach der selbstverständlichen „Nähe“ des Selbst*. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), p. 210.

⁶⁵ See S. Taguchi, *Das Problem des „Ur-Ich“*..., p. 212 (footnote 76).

⁶⁶ See S. Taguchi, *Das Problem des „Ur-Ich“*..., p. 121.

Bibliography

- Brand G. 1955. *Welt, Ich und Zeit. Nach unveröffentlichten Manuskripten Edmund Husserls*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Chudy W. 1995. *Rozwój filozofowania a „pułapka refleksji.” Filozofia refleksji i próby jej przezwyciężenia*. Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL.
- Czarkowski J. 1994. *Filozofia czystej świadomości. Redukcja, refleksja, czysta świadomość w fenomenologii transcendentnej Edmunda Husserla*. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika.
- Fink E. 1988. VI. *Cartesianische Meditation. Teil 1: Die Idee einer transzendentalen Methodenlehre. Texte aus dem Nachlass Eugen Finks (1932) mit Anmerkungen und Beilagen aus dem Nachlass Edmund Husserls (1933/34)*. Hrsg. von H. Ebeling, J. Holl, G. van Kerckhoven. *Husserliana—Dokumente*. Bd. 2/1. Dordrecht–Boston–London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Fink E. 2004. “Edmund Husserl.” In: *Nähe und Distanz. Phänomenologische Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Hrsg. von F.-A. Schwarz, 75–97. Freiburg–München: Verlag Karl Alber.
- Fink E. 2004. “Philosophie als Überwindung der ‘Naivität,’” in: *Nähe und Distanz. Phänomenologische Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Hrsg. von F.-A. Schwarz, 98–126. Freiburg–München: Verlag Karl Alber.
- Hoffmann G. 2001. *Bewusstsein, Reflexion und Ich bei Husserl*. Freiburg–München: Verlag Karl Alber.
- Hoffmann G. 1997. “Die Zweideutigkeit der Reflexion als Wahrnehmung von Anonymität,” *Husserl Studies* 14: 95–121.
- Husserl E. 1959. *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Teil 2: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion*. Hrsg. von R. Boehm. *Husserliana—Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke*. Bd. 8. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl E. 1962. *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*. Hrsg. von W. Biemel. *Husserliana—Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke*. Bd. 6. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl E. 1962. *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*. Hrsg. von W. Biemel. *Husserliana—Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke*. Bd. 9. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl E. 1976. *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Buch 1: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*. Neu hrsg. von K. Schuhmann. Halbband 1. Text der 1.–3. Aufl. *Husserliana—Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke*. Bd. 3/1. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl E. 1982. *Cartesian Meditations*. Trans. D. Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

- Husserl E. 1989. *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*. Trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer. Dordrecht–Boston–London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Husserl E. 2002. *Einleitung in die Philosophie. Vorlesungen 1922/23*. Hrsg. von B. Goossens. *Husserliana—Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke*. Bd. 35. Dordrecht–Boston–London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Husserl E. 2002. *Zur phänomenologischen Reduktion. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1926–1935)*. Hrsg. von S. Luft. *Husserliana—Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke*. Bd. 34. Dordrecht–Boston–London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Janssen P. 1970. *Geschichte und Lebenswelt. Ein Beitrag zur Diskussion von Husserls Spätwerk*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Judycki S. 1990. *Intersubiektywność i czas. Przyczynek do dyskusji nad późną fazą poglądów Edmunda Husserla*. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL.
- Kern I. 1964. *Husserl und Kant. Eine Untersuchung über Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Luft S. 2002. "Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie." *Systematik und Methodologie der Phänomenologie in der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Husserl und Fink*. Dordrecht–Boston–London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Łaciak P. 2012. *Anonimowość jako granica poznania w fenomenologii Edmunda Husserla*. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego.
- Noras A.J. 2005. *Kant a neokantyzm badeński i marburski*. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego.
- Ricoeur P. 1949. "Husserl et le sens l'histoire," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 54: 280–316.
- Rosen K. 1977. *Evidenz in Husserls deskriptiver Transzendentalphilosophie*. Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain.
- Seeböhm T. 1962. *Die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Transzendental-Philosophie. Edmund Husserls transzendental-phänomenologischer Ansatz, dargestellt im Anschluss an seine Kant-Kritik*. Bonn: H. Bouvier u. Co. Verlag.
- Shin G.H. 1978. *Die Struktur des inneren Zeitbewußtseins. Eine Studie über den Begriff der Protention in den veröffentlichten Schriften Edmund Husserls*. Bern: Verlag Peter Lang.
- Ströker E. 1987. *Phänomenologische Studien*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
- Stróżewski W. 2013. "O przeświadczeniach," in: *Logos, wartość, miłość*. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak.
- Taguchi S. 2006. *Das Problem des „Ur-Ich“ bei Edmund Husserl. Die Frage nach der selbstverständlichen „Nähe“ des Selbst*. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Tugendhat E. 1967. *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co.
- Wojtyła K. 1978. "Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man," *Analecta Husserliana* 7: 107–114.

Piotr Łaciak

Dogmatyzm i krytycyzm w koncepcji redukcji fenomenologicznej

Streszczenie: Autor przeprowadza własną interpretację redukcji fenomenologicznej, wychodząc od wyróżnionych przez Ernsta Tugendhata dwóch motywów fenomenologii: motywu dogmatycznego i krytycznego. W interpretacji dogmatycznej redukcja fenomenologiczna jest motywowana potrzebą spełnienia wymogu oczywistości apodyktycznej i oznacza wyłączenie świata oraz ograniczenie pola badań fenomenologii do dziedziny świadomości transcendentalnej. Jedynie świadomość transcendentalna bowiem może być dana w oczywistości apodyktycznej, podczas gdy istnienie świata nie jest nigdy apodyktycznie pewne. W interpretacji krytycznej oczywistość apodyktyczna nie jest punktem wyjścia filozofowania, lecz minimum dogmatyczności wszelkiego poznania odnalezionym na drodze radykalnej krytyki. Sama redukcja fenomenologiczna nie oznacza już subiektywistycznego zawężenia pola badań, lecz jego rozszerzenie o nowy wymiar: wymiar wyzwolonej z anonimowości świadomości, w której konstituuje się świat. Celem redukcji zinterpretowanej krytycznie jest odsłonięcie zakrytej w nastawieniu naturalnym korelacji świadomości i świata. Redukcja odsłania tę korelację, zawieszając przesady (*Vorurteile*), które wypływają z nastawienia naturalnego. Zawieszenie przesądów oznacza powstrzymanie się od ich bezrefleksyjnego spełniania, to znaczy poddanie ich refleksji, ponieważ cechą charakterystyczną przesądów jest bezrefleksyjność. Należy odróżnić dwa rodzaje przesądów: przesady, które umożliwiają poznanie świata oraz przesady, które zniekształcają obraz rzeczywistości. Autor wykazuje, że redukcję fenomenologiczną można potraktować jako postulat krytycyzmu: należy zawieszać przesady po to, aby rozpoznać zasadność (prawomocność) ich roszczeń do mocy obowiązującej bądź zdemaskować jako fałszywą świadomość.

Słowa kluczowe: dogmatyzm, krytycyzm, redukcja fenomenologiczna, oczywistość, refleksja transcendentalna, przesąd